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REMARKS ON THE PROCESS OF JUDGING
WLiAM H. REHNQUIST*
I have been asked to address one aspect of "contemporary challenges
to judging." I could regale you with mind-numbing statistics about docket
congestion and the like, but I sense that something more philosophical, and
perhaps more interesting, is called for by this special occasion.
Legal historian William W. Fisher III recently suggested that the major
schools of legal theory which "have developed since World War II are best
understood as efforts to meet the challenges presented by Legal Realism,"
a school of jurisprudence which had its inception roughly around the start
of this century.' Before Legal Realism, most lawyers and judges operated
under the assumption that judges simply "found" the law necessary to
decide a particular case. In Oliver Wendell Holmes' words, the law was
seen as a "brooding omnipresence in the sky." This "oracular theory of
judging" was, in a sense, fully consistent with the underlying theory of
English common law at the time our Constitution was adopted: sound legal
training in existing case law was all it took to discover the rule of decision
applicable to the case at hand.
The advent of the Legal Realist School disabused us of that notion.
Few would now argue against the proposition that judging involves creating
law, at least to some extent. But if it does, what provides the source of the
judge's creative inspiration? Legal Realists-so called because they were said
to believe that what a judge had for breakfast made more difference in
how he would decide a case than what he knew about existing precedents-
were at pains to point out that a judge's background might have as much
to do with the way he went about deciding a case as would his legal
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education. And I suppose that the large measure of truth that adheres in
this view is generally accepted today. Judges, whether at the trial or appellate
level, are not fungible. Each one of us brings to the bench a mind imprinted
with previous experience, and that experience undoubtedly influences, to a
certain extent, how we go about the process of deciding cases.
Today I will briefly discuss three judges who began their judicial careers
in the early twentieth century and outline how they came to terms with this
central challenge of Legal Realism. I will then offer some concluding
observations about what seems to me to be the incompleteness, if you will,
of the Legal Realists' treatment of judging. All three of the judges-
Benjamin Cardozo, Learned Hand, and Jerome Frank-thought deeply
about the process of judging, and all developed answers that satisfied them,
although I daresay many critics could debate how satisfactory those answers
were. I will largely rely on the views they stated extrajudicially, for all three
were prolific producers off the bench. They also left us with some comments
on each other, which provide valuable insights into both author and subject.
In the person of Benjamin Cardozo we had the ultimate scholar judge.
Although from today's vantage point we may find it hard to appreciate the
verve and originality of his seminal work, The Nature of the Judicial
Process, written in 1921, its central insight-that judges are consciously
creative agents in the law's evolution-thoroughly validated the views of
the Legal Realists. I think it is important to remember that when Cardozo
wrote this work, he was a judge on the New York Court of Appeals and
was essentially talking about the evolution of the common law.
Cardozo was born in New York City in 1870. He descended from
Sephardic Jews with a long tradition of public service. One ancestor served
in the Revolutionary War while another, a rabbi, participated in George
Washington's inauguration. Yet another relative wrote the words at the base
of the Statue of Liberty. Alas, such illustrious fame did not befall Cardozo's
father. The elder Cardozo, a Tammany Hall judge, left, a legacy of infamy.
Implicated in the Boss Tweed city government scandal and charged with
graft, he chose to resign rather than face impeachment. Many believed this
family disgrace was a formative influence on Cardozo. Jerome Frank, not
one to ignore the psychological impact of such a childhood event, said it
made Cardozo into a contradictory personality; a recluse and a public
servant; part of the contemporary scene, yet detached from it; "an 18th
century scholar and gentleman" living in the twentieth.
2
Despite the handicap of his father's disgrace, Cardozo was marked for
extraordinary achievement from early in his life. He entered Columbia
University at the precocious age of fifteen. He studied at Columbia Law
School, but joined the New York bar without obtaining a degree. Over the
next two decades, Cardozo and his brother enjoyed a successful appellate
practice. Then, in 1914, he put aside the practice of law to seek public
2. Jerome N. Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. Cm. L. Ray.
666, 672-73 (1957).
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office. In rapid succession he became first a judge of the New York trial
court and then a judge of the New York Court of Appeals. He became its
chief judge in 1923. Cardozo's service on New York's highest court extended
for a total of eighteen years, until 1932, when Herbert Hoover appointed
him to replace the retiring Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Court.
Cardozo's greatest contribution, however, was his work as a common
law judge on the New York Court of Appeals and the extrajudicial writings
he used to explain his views on the judicial experience. Those views evolved
from an oracular view of law to something far different. As a judge, he
wrote of being troubled in his search for legal certainty, "to find how
trackless was the ocean on which [he] had embarked." ' 3 As the years
progressed he came to accept the inevitability of uncertainty:
I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have grown
to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the process in its
highest reaches is not discovery, but creation; and that the doubts
and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part of the travail of mind,
the pangs of death and the pangs of birth, in which principles that
have served their day expire, and new principles are born.
4
Cardozo's insights laid bare what Learned Hand called the basic con-
tradiction of a judge's role. "[H]e must preserve his authority by cloaking
himself in the majesty of an overshadowing past; but he must discover
some composition with the dominant trends of his time." 5 Cardozo was
fascinated with how judges could manage this role, and he devoted his
career to carrying it out in practice, as well as describing it. By judging "in
the grand tradition," he pointed out a way for reconciling the creative side
of judging with a judicial style that values continuity, tradition and stability.
Learned Hand, as you can probably guess from his comments, regarded
Cardozo as one of his judicial idols. The feeling was mutual. Cardozo
placed Hand in a group of "two or three" judges who approached Oliver
Wendell Holmes in his esteem. By the end of his long judicial career-he
spent over fifty years on the bench if you include his time in senior status-
Hand was admired almost as much as Cardozo and Holmes, even though
he never sat on the Supreme Court. Instead, he spent his entire career on
the lower federal courts-first the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and later the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
Hand began his life in Albany, New York and also came from a family
with a long tradition of legal service. His grandfather served as a New York
State judge for eight years, and his father received an interim appointment
to New York's highest court, although a change of political fortunes denied
3. BENJAMIN N. CADOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).
4. Id. at 166-67.
5. LEARNED HAND, Mr. Justice Cardozo, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 98, 99 (Irving
Dilliard ed., Vintage Books 1959) (1952).
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him a permanent seat. Learned Hand's favorite cousin, Augustus Hand,
followed him to the district court and later to the Second Circuit, where
he developed a reputation second only to his cousin. Indeed, in some circles
Augustus Hand's decisions were regarded as more reliable. Supreme Court
Justice Robert Jackson used to say "quote Learned and follow Gus."
Hand gained professional recognition from the soundness of his deci-
sions and the power of his judicial prose. Although his opinion style might
be regarded today as a bit formal and legalistic, it nonetheless resounded
with pithy aphorisms. Hand would still make anyone's "top ten" list of
quotable judges-witness his dissent to a majority decision attempting to
anticipate developments in the Supreme Court, where he wrote, "[it's not]
desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of
anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth
is distant." 6
Hand also gained fame because of his personality. You could describe
him as a "real piece of work." Jerome Frank wrote that Hand made his
life a work of art, like a novel written by himself. He was a notable
raconteur and mimic. He would break out into a Gilbert and Sullivan song
or sea chantey with the slightest encouragement, he sang hymns at noon in
the courthouse to accompany the chimes of a nearby church, and the
Library of Congress has a recording of him singing folk songs. On the
bench, he had a deserved reputation for angry outbursts. According to one
of his Second Circuit colleagues, "[h]is thunder terrified the boldest counsel
and his lightning questions and comments could short-circuit any argu-
ment." 7 Afterwards, however, he often repented and offered apologies for
his abruptness.
Like Cardozo, Hand also gained recognition from his extrajudicial
writings. He did not produce scholarly treatises like Cardozo's, but he was
a frequent public speaker. In those speeches Hand reacted to the challenge
of Realist Jurisprudence-partly accepting its assumptions, but denying its
conclusion that idiosyncratic, subjective judging was inevitable. He accepted,
almost as an article of faith, that a judge could avoid asserting his own
predilections by practicing detachment, skepticism, and the virtues of insti-
tutional self-restraint. Detachment was the first crucial element of Hand's
judicial craftsmanship. '[J]udge as though it weren't your fight,' he urged.
8
He believed this was possible despite the conclusions of the Realists:
There are those who insist that detachment is an illusion; that our
conclusions, when their bases are sifted, always reveal a passional
foundation. Even so; though they be throughout the creatures of
6. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, C.J.,
dissenting).
7. J. Edward Lumbard, Learned Hand Memorial Issue, 33 N.Y. ST. B.J. 410 (1961),
quoted in MARVIN SCmICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 15 (1970).
8. HERSHEL SHANKS, THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING: THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE
LEARNED HAND 20 (1968).
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past emotional experience, it does not follow that that experience
can never predispose us to impartiality. A bias against bias may be
as likely a result of some buried crisis, as any other bias. 9
Skepticism was the second element in Learned Hand's triad of judicial
values. He abhorred absolutes, and believed that a judge must always be
prepared to question his own assumptions. He frequently quoted, as key to
his overall judicial philosophy, Oliver Cromwell's speech before the Battle
of Dunbar: 'I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may be
mistaken." 0 If we are to be saved, he said, it must be through skepticism.
This led Hand to subject his own premises to scrutiny and to set out clearly
the basis for his judicial decisions, lest he fall into what he regarded as one
of the greatest judicial sins-to beg the question or hide the means by
which he reached a result. Consequently, you can always follow the path
of reasoning in his opinions-they are like those books on castles and
cathedrals by David MacCaulay-the framework and mortar are all shown,
and nothing is obscured from view.
Finally, as the third component of his judicial philosophy, Hand believed
in judicial self-restraint. "The price of their [the judiciary's] continued
power," he stated, "must therefore be a self-denying ordinance.""1 This
notion came out of Hand's understanding of democracy and the judiciary's
limited role in nullifying actions of the political branches of government.
The judiciary would lose its independence, Hand believed, should it take
upon itself the burden of having the last word in basic conflicts of right
and wrong. Instead, those decisions should be left to the give and take of
the democratic process. Hand accordingly adhered to a philosophy that is
somewhat out of fashion in some circles today, for he was skeptical about
judges' attempts to enforce the Bill of Rights' vaguer guarantees. To do
so, he believed, would not only destroy the judiciary, but would also show
democracy's bankruptcy. In a letter to Chief Justice Harlan Stone at the
time when the majority of the Roosevelt Court was giving a more expansive
reading to some constitutional guarantees, he referred to these Justices as
the "heralds of a brighter day."
Jerome Frank was not nearly so restrained in his responses to Legal
Realism, which is not so surprising, given that he was one of the vigorous
proponents of that school of thought. To begin with, Frank had a forceful
style of writing that minced no words and left no doubts where he stood.
In contemporary slang it would be called a "take no prisoners style." A
good example is what he said about Lord Coke, former Chief Justice of
England, who was revered by those who believed in an oracular theory of
law:
9. LEARNED HAND, Thomas Walter Swan, in TE Sprr oF LIBERTY 158, 165 (Irving
DiUlliard ed., Vintage Books 1959) (1952).
10. LEARNED HAND, Morals in Public Life, in THE SPIR oF LiBERTY 170, 174 (Irving
Dilliard ed., Vintage Books 1959) (1952).
11. LEARnED HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in
THE SPIrT oF LMBERTY 118, 121 (Irving Dilliard ed., Vintage Books 1959) (1952).
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Coke was a nasty, narrow-minded, greedy, cruel, arrogant, insen-
sitive man, a time-serving politician and a liar who, by his adulation
of some crabbed medieval legal doctrines, had retarded English and
American legal development for centuries.1
2
He used equally strong words about those he disagreed with, as well as his
colleagues on the bench, all of which made him no friends. Yet to those
who knew him other than through his written works, he was a warm-
hearted and generous man. Paradoxes such as this characterized Jerome
Frank's life.
Like Cardozo and Hand, Frank came from a family of lawyers-his
father practiced corporate law in Chicago, where Frank grew up. His finance
law practice took him frequently to New York City, where he moved in
1928. While continuing his finance practice in New York, he began his
writing career. When his seminal work, Law and the Modern Mind, was
published in 1930, the legal world recognized it as one of the boldest
statements of Legal Realism. Based on his own readings and experience
with psychiatry, Frank stated the Realist credo that law was neither logical
nor predictable, but instead depended on the judge's unconscious motiva-
tions and prejudices.
Frank was one of a number of lawyers who was attracted to government
service by Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. He served in the legal departments
of several government agencies, and in 1939 succeeded William 0. Douglas
as Chairman of the SEC. In 1941, Roosevelt appointed him to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This choice was likened to "the choice
of a heretic to be a bishop of the Church of Rome.' 1 3 Along with his
contributions to debunking the "cult of the robe," Frank had helped found
the National Lawyers Guild in 1936, which won him the enmity of some
of the legal establishment. His views on judging were thought to be too
radical to qualify him for the bench. Despite these views, he wore his
judicial robes well. •
Although Frank's Realist views presumably regarded Hand's philosophy
of detachment and restraint as hopelessly naive, Frank was nonetheless an
unabashed admirer of Hand. He dedicated one of his books to him and
thought him a "great judge," despite the fact that during one ten year
period they agreed with each other only thirty-seven percent of the time
when they sat together.
How could an avowed "rule-skeptic" such as Frank follow stare decisis
and the other commandments of the judicial craft? One answer, I suppose,
is that Frank's views changed over time, and that despite his earlier
"debunking," he came to appreciate the need for order and authority that
legal rules provide. Another is that although Frank never changed his basic
assumptions, he nonetheless saw his judicial role as serving a valuable
12. Frank, supra note 2, at 666.
13. William Seagle, Book Review, 29 VA. L. Rv. 664, 664 (1943).
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function-that of the judge's teacher. Felix Frankfurter said that "No judge
in our time used his judicial opinions so systematically as a candid and
discursive means for legal education.' '1 4 But Frank also came to accept the
institutional constraints of judging as a partial antidote for the inherently
subjective nature of the process.
Each of these three judges made significant contributions to understand-
ing the process of judging, and the legal profession is much indebted to
them. One unfortunate aspect of their writings, when taken out of context,
however, and indeed of the writings of many of the Legal Realists, is the
emphasis on the individualized nature of judging at the expense of its
collegial and institutional aspects. On more than one occasion, I have been
asked with respect to our Court, "does oral argument really make any
difference?" This question is usually asked, if not with a sly wink, at least
with the implied suggestion that of course everybody knows that it doesn't.
The next logical question, I suppose, is "do the briefs really make any
difference?" The implication of these questions is that the process of briefing
and arguing a case is largely ceremonial, because each judge will have
decided in advance of all that how he will vote based on his subjective
predilections.
This sort of skepticism-nay, cynicism-puts too little store in the fact
that appellate judging is a deliberative process. Although the process ends
up with the casting of a vote, it is not like the vote of a legislator. One
member of Congress, for example, may have made a very careful study of
the merits and demerits of a particular pending bill, assessed its effect on
constituents, and may vote accordingly. Another may-know virtually nothing
about the bill; upon entering the chamber, he gets a signal from the party
whip as to how to vote, and dutifully complies. Both votes count the same;
and that is democracy.
Appellate judging, happily, does not work this way. Judges read the
briefs, they study the cases, they sit on the bench to hear the case orally
argued, and they then sit around the conference table to discuss and vote
upon it. Ultimately a proposed majority opinion is circulated, and if the
court is divided, dissenting and perhaps concurring opinions are forthcom-
ing. Only after all of these steps have taken place does a judge finally
decide how to vote. A judge's vote may be exactly the same as his tentative
inclination was at the time he first read the briefs. But it may not be; in
the interim between reading the briefs and finally voting, he has had the
benefit of oral argument, listening to the views of colleagues at conference,
and seeing the way in which a proposed result is justified in writing. Minds
can and do change at any stage in this process.
The judge whom we honor by these dedication proceedings-Lewis F.
Powell-recognized to the fullest degree that judging is not only a process,
but a deliberative process. He brought with him to the bench, as we all do,
a mind imprinted with past experience. His past experience was quite
14. Felix Frankfurter, Jerome N. Frank, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 625, 625 (1957).
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remarkable-a high ranking officer in Air Force Intelligence overseas during
World War II, a senior partner in a very successful Richmond law firm,
President of the American Bar Association, President of the Richmond
School Board during the time of Virginia's massive resistance to school
desegregation. Inevitably these experiences helped to shape his judicial
philosophy.
But Lewis Powell recognized, more than some of his predecessors, that
judging is not simply an exercise in intellectual virtuosity. He had his own
views, and at times could cling tenaciously to them, but he always saw the
Supreme Court as an institution that was greater than the sum of its parts.
There must be an effort to get an opinion for at least a majority of the
Court in every case where that is possible, in order that lower court judges
and the profession as a whole may know what the lav' is without having
to go through an elaborate head-counting process. To accomplish this, some
give and take is inevitable, and doctrinal purity may be muddied in the
process.
It is this sort of institutional constraint and discipline, too often unre-
cognized or subordinated in the pigeonholing of judges by labels, that itself
furnishes a very substantial check on judges who might otherwise be guided
only by their individual predilections in any given case. Judging inevitably
has a large individual component in it, but the individual contribution of
a good judge is filtered through the deliberative process of the court as a
body, with all that this implies. Lewis Powell knew this, and during his
fifteen years of distinguished service on our Court he acted accordingly. He
wrote more than his share of opinions for the Court, some memorable; he
wrote his share of dissents, some memorable. But he never lost sight of the
fact that an appellate judge's primary task is to function as a member of
a collegial body which must decide important questions of federal law in a
way that gives intelligible guidance to the bench and bar. Memorable
opinions were the by-product of that process, not an end in themselves.
